Ethics for the 21st century
Edinburgh, 2-4 July 2009

Zellentin,Alexa, University of Oxford
Email:  alexa.zellentin@keble.ox.ac.uk
Treating Citizens as Equals in the context of Pluralism
Liberalism claims that the state ought to treat citizens as equals. What this requires is unclear. Treating them equally is often insufficient since some differences matter. This is obvious in the case of handicaps but, as multiculturalists emphasise, some cultural differences matter, too. The question is thus what kind of differences matter when and what it means to take them seriously.
This paper proposes that any approach to what it means to treat citizens as equals must relate to the respect in which they are to be treated as equals: to their role as citizens. Following Rawls’ conception of citizens as free and equal, citizens are equal if they have the two moral powers to the necessary minimal degree to be fully cooperating members of society. Treating citizens as equals thus means to respect the capacities in virtue of which they are to be considered as equals: their capacities for a conception of the good and of the right. This means, first, to give them the greatest liberty for making use of these capacities that is compatible with the same liberty for everyone else. It requires furthermore taking seriously that people come to different conclusions concerning justice and the good. While the state has to promote one political conception of justice to ensure its citizens their equal basic rights and freedoms, it must not promote any one conception of the good life. Treating citizens as equals thus requires first of all justificatory neutrality. However, this is not enough: Every implementation of neutrally justified regulations will be advantageous for some and inconvenient for others. This is unproblematic only if inconvenience is unavoidable and everyone had a fair opportunity to influence the way the regulation is implemented.  That is, while reference to particular conceptions of the good is prohibited in debates on the justification of state regulations, such reference is necessary in debates concerning their implementation.

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